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Judgments about whether an action is morally right or wrong typically depend on our
capacity to infer the actor’s beliefs and the outcomes of the action. Prior neuroimaging
studies have found that mental state (e.g., beliefs, intentions) attribution for moral
judgment involves a complex neural network that includes the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ). However, neuroimaging studies cannot demonstrate a direct causal relationship
between the activity of this brain region and mental state attribution for moral judgment.
In the current study, we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to transiently
alter neural activity in the TPJ. The participants were randomly assigned to one of three
stimulation treatments (right anodal/left cathodal tDCS, left anodal/right cathodal tDCS,
or sham stimulation). Each participant was required to complete two similar tasks of
moral judgment before receiving tDCS and after receiving tDCS. We studied whether
tDCS to the TPJ altered mental state attribution for moral judgment. The results indicated
that restraining the activity of the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) or the left the
temporoparietal junction (LTPJ) decreased the role of beliefs in moral judgments and
led to an increase in the dependance of the participants’ moral judgments on the
action’s consequences. We also found that the participants exhibited reduced reaction
times both in the cases of intentional harms and attempted harms after receiving right
cathodal/left anodal tDCS to the TPJ. These findings inform and extend the current
neural models of moral judgment and moral development in typically developing people
and in individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism.
Keywords: theory of mind, moral judgment, beliefs and outcomes, temporoparietal junction, transcranial direct
current stimulation
INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, a harm caused by an action is morally worse than an equivalent harm caused
by omission, and a harm intended as the means to a goal is morally worse than an equivalent
harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal (Cushman et al., 2006; Young and Koenigs, 2007).
Moral judgment entails judging others’ actions on the dimension of right and wrong, but this
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requires not only the outcomes of these actions but also the
cognitive ability to think about another person’s beliefs and
intentions, which is known as ‘‘theory of mind’’ (Young and Saxe,
2008).
A number of recent studies indeed demonstrate that mental
state information (e.g., desire, belief, intention) is one of
the crucial inputs into moral decision-making (for a review,
see Young and Tsoi, 2013). Evidence from developmental
psychology also shows that children (even preverbal infants)
start condemning negative intent that does not result in negative
outcome (see Baird and Astington, 2004; Killen et al., 2011).
But when beliefs and outcomes are incongruent with each other,
there are different ways that this incongruence can behaviorally
present itself relying on the valence of the conflicting belief and
outcome (Patil and Silani, 2014).
Cushman (2008) found that judgments of punishment
depended jointly on mental states and the causal relationship
of an agent to a harmful consequence. An account of these
phenomena has been proposed that distinguished two processes
of moral judgment (Young et al., 2007; Cushman et al., 2013;
Cushman, 2013): one which begins with harmful outcome and
attributes condemnation to the causally responsible agent, and
the other which begins with an action and analyses the mental
states responsible for that action.
Neuroimaging studies have investigated the selectivity and
domain specificity of these brain regions for thinking about
another person’s thoughts. These regions, which comprise the
‘‘theory of mind network, ’’ include the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC), precuneus (PC), right superior temporal sulcus (RSTS),
and bilateral temporal-parietal junction (TPJ; Gallagher et al.,
2000; Vogeley et al., 2001; Ruby and Decety, 2003; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003; Aichhorn et al., 2009).
The precise role of these brain regions in theory of mind for
moral judgment has been the topic of recent researches (Young
et al., 2007; Young and Saxe, 2008). Specifically, the TPJ exhibits
increased activity whenever participants read about a person’s
beliefs in nonmoral (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Powell,
2006) or moral contexts (Young et al., 2007, 2010b). However,
fMRI cannot demonstrate direct causal relationships between the
activities in these brain regions and mental state attribution for
moral judgment.
Noninvasive brain stimulation techniques, such as rTMS,
allow for the study of the decision consequences of externally
restrained brain activity in healthy participants and thus the
establishment of causal connections between the brain and
decisions without many of the confounds inherent to natural
lesion studies (Rafal, 2001; Robertson et al., 2003). Young et al.
(2010a) and Jeurissen et al. (2014) used rTMS to transiently
suppress activity in the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ)
and provided evidence for the causal role of this structure in
mental state attribution for moral judgment.
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) has some
advantages relative to rTMS because it induces a stronger
modulatory effect on brain activity (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000;
Romero et al., 2002), allowing for reliable sham stimulation
(Gandiga et al., 2006). Importantly, anodal tDCS increases
excitability in targeted brain regions, which can transiently
enhance decisions and judgment in healthy humans (Fregni et al.,
2005; Wassermann and Grafman, 2005).
The goal of the present study was to alter moral judgments
by modulating the cortical excitability over the TPJ in healthy
adults. To measure the participants’ capacities to infer the actor’s
mental state attributions in moral judgment, we presented the
participants with moral scenarios in which (i) the protagonist
acts on either a negative belief (e.g., that he or she will cause harm
to another person) or on a neutral belief and (ii) the protagonist
either causes a negative outcome (e.g., harm to another person)
or a neutral outcome (Young et al., 2007; Young and Saxe, 2008).
Participants made judgments on a scale of 1 (permissible) to 10
(forbidden), which were regarded as their condemnation ratings
towards the behaviors described.
Previous findings have provided direct evidence supporting
the critical role of the RTPJ in mediating belief attribution
for moral judgment, For example Young et al. (2010a)
revealed that the disruption of the RTPJ with TMS led
participants to rely their judgments less on the actor’s mental
states, and Sellaro et al. (2015) found that participants who
received anodal tDCS over the RTPJ assigned less blame
to accidental harms compared to participants who received
sham stimulation. However, a direct causal relationship
between left temporoparietal junction (LTPJ) and mental
state attribution for moral judgments has not been studied.
In the present study, we sought to firstly test whether
modulating the activity of the LTPJ activity with tDCS
would also influence the role of beliefs on moral judgments.
Therefore, we performed an experiment to investigate whether
bilateral stimulation of the TPJ (anodal stimulation of the
right and cathodal stimulation of the left TPJ or vice versa)
would alter mental state attribution for moral judgments.
Our findings suggested that restraining the RTPJ or LTPJ
with tDCS decreased the role of beliefs in moral judgment.
Combining our findings with those of previous work,
we infer that the RTPJ and LTPJ commonly represent
the ability to use mental states in moral judgment and
that both are responsible for the role of belief in moral
judgment.
Besides the difference in stimulation electrode positions
from previous evidence, the present study has novel assignment
for moral judgment task and classification for story context.
The previous experiments demonstrated the role of the
RTPJ on belief attribution by comparing participants’
moral judgments following TMS to the RTPJ and TMS to a
control brain region (Young et al., 2010a), or investigating
participants’ performance on the moral judgment task
before and after having received anodal, cathodal, or sham
tDCS over the RTPJ (Sellaro et al., 2015). These studies
selected and randomly distributed moral stories among
different treatments (including active stimulations and sham
stimulation) and different tasks (pre-tDCS and post-tDCS
task) to test their hypotheses. However, they haven’t made
sure the balance and similarity of moral stories across the
treatments and tasks. In this study, each participant was
required to complete a similar (and we demonstrated the
similarity) moral judgment task before and after receiving
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tDCS. Therefore, we combined within-subject and between-
subject design in this experiment to test the causal role
of the bilateral TPJ regarding mental states in moral
judgment.
In addition, how one should act toward another depends
on whether the target is a friend, a stranger, a subordinate,
or an authority (Dungan and Young, 2012). Therefore,
we have assigned two different types of story context that
involved economic interests and relationships with friends
in moral judgment task to explore the role of TPJ on the
actors’ mental state attributions for moral judgment across
different contexts. Analyses indicated that in conditions
of neutral belief, the condemnation ratings of contexts
involving economic interests were lower than those of
contexts involving relationship with friends. Moreover,
in conditions of negative belief with contexts involving
economic interests, the condemnation ratings were lower
after receiving right anodal/left cathodal tDCS. These findings
indicate that the restraining effect of tDCS on the LTPJ in
the role of beliefs in moral judgment depends on moral
context.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
We recruited 54 healthy college students (32 females; mean
age 22.11 years, ranging from 19–30 years) to participate
in our experiment. All participants were right-handed and
naïve to tDCS and moral judgment tasks, and they had
no history of psychiatric illness or neurological disorders.
The participants were randomly assigned to receive right
anodal/left cathodal tDCS over TPJ (n = 18, 11 females),
left anodal/right cathodal tDCS over TPJ (n = 18, 11
females) or sham stimulation over TPJ (n = 18, 10 females).
Each participant received 50 RMB yuan (approximately
7.995 US dollars) for their participation. Participants
gave written informed consent before entering the study,
which was approved by the Zhejiang University ethics
committee. No participants reported any adverse side
effects about pain on the scalp or headaches after the
experiment.
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
(tDCS)
tDCS was induced by two saline-soaked surface sponge
electrodes (35 cm2). Direct current was constant and
delivered by a battery-driven stimulator (Multichannel
noninvasive wireless tDCS neurostimulator, Starlab, Barcelona,
Spain), which was controlled through a Bluetooth signal.
It was adjusted to induce cortical excitability of the
target area without causing any physiological damage
to the participants. Various orientations of the current
had various effects on the cortical excitability. Generally
speaking, anodal stimulation enhances cortical excitability,
whereas cathodal stimulation inhibits it (Nitsche and Paulus,
2000).
TPJ was localized with location CP5 (left) and CP6 (right)
on an EEG cap laid out according to the International 10–20
System (Figure 1A). Participants were randomly assigned to
one of the three single-blinded stimulation treatments. For right
anodal/left cathodal stimulation, the anodal electrode was placed
over the CP6 according to the international EEG 10–20 system,
while the cathodal electrode was placed over the CP5. For left
anodal/right cathodal stimulation the placement was reversed.
The anodal electrode was placed over CP5 and the cathodal
electrode was placed over CP6 (Figures 1B,C). Therefore, the
target electrode (either the anode or the cathode) was centered
over CP6/CP5; the return electrode was placed over CP5/CP6.
The reason we chose a bifrontal electrode montage was to
provide stimulation able to enhance the activity of one side
of the TPJ while simultaneously diminish the other side. For
sham stimulation, the procedures were totally the same but the
current lasted only for the first 30 s. The participants may have
felt the initial itching, but actually there was no current for
the rest of the stimulation. This method of sham stimulation
has been shown to be reliable (Gandiga et al., 2006). The
current had an intensity of 2 mA with 15 s of ramp up and
down, the safety and efficiency of which was shown in previous
studies.
After the participant finished the first moral judgment task
(the computer program for these tasks was written in visual
C#) which was similar to Young’s design (Young et al., 2010a),
the laboratory assistant put a tDCS device on his/her head for
FIGURE 1 | Electrode placements. (A) Schematic of the electrode positions based on the EEG 10–20 system. (B) Left anodal/right cathodal stimulation over the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) of the human brain. (C) Right anodal/left cathodal stimulation over the TPJ of the human brain. The axis represents the range of input
voltage from −18.476 to 14.463 V.
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stimulation and removed him/her from the computer screen.
After 15 min of stimulation, the participant was then asked to
complete the latter moral judgment task with the stimulation
being delivered for another 5 min (Figure 2).
Task and Procedure
The experiment included two moral judgment tasks. Each
participant was required to complete a moral judgment task
before receiving tDCS and to complete another moral judgment
task after receiving tDCS. To eliminate the sequence effect of the
two tasks, we randomly assigned half of the participants (Part I)
to complete moral judgment task A (including story S1 and S2)
before receiving tDCS and to complete moral judgment task B
(including story S∗1 and S∗2) after receiving tDCS; the remaining
participants (Part II) completed task B before receiving tDCS
and completed task A after receiving tDCS (Figure 3). Each story
was based on a type of context that involved economic interests
(S1 and S∗1) or relationships with friends (S2 and S∗2).
There were four conditions in each story that included belief
(negative vs. neutral) and outcome (negative vs. neutral) factors
to yield a 2 × 2 design. Specifically, they were intentional harm
(negative belief and negative outcome), accidental harm (neutral
belief and negative outcome), attempted harm (negative belief
and neutral outcome) and nonharm (neutral belief and neutral
outcome). Stories were presented in cumulative segments, each
presented for 8 s, describing in a fixed order: (i) background;
(ii) foreshadow; (iii) belief; and (iv) action. The background
was identical across conditions. Stories were then removed
from the screen and replaced with a question about the moral
permissibility of the action. Participants made judgments on
a scale of 1 (permissible) to 10 (forbidden) using a computer
keyboard, which were regarded as their condemnation ratings
towards the behaviors described. The time limit for responding
was 6 s. The reaction times were recorded and all of the
participants had made judgments within the time limit.
The participants were required to read and make judgments
about two moral stories with four conditions respectively before
receiving tDCS. After completing this moral judgment task,
they had a break and received tDCS for 15 min. Subsequently,
they were required to read and make judgments about another
two stories with four conditions respectively while receiving
stimulation for another 5 min. The latter moral judgment task
was similar to the first moral judgment task to avoid learning
effects in the within-subject design experiment. Both tasks
included two stories (S1 and S∗1 ; S2 and S∗2) with four conditions
(Figure 4). The same participant saw all four variations of the
same story in both sessions, eight stories pre-stimulation and
eight-stories post-stimulation, for a total of 16 stories. On average
each story consisted of about 91 words, and the number of words
was matched across conditions and tasks. When the subjects
completed the two moral judgment tasks, they were asked to
complete a questionnaire before finally receiving their payment.
Data Analysis
We first tested the similarity of tasks A and B using repeated
measures analyses of variance (ANOVA). Giving the two tasks
were equivalent in terms of condemnation ratings and reaction
times before receiving tDCS, it ensured us to compare the
performance of the participants before and after receiving
tDCS. Then we used repeated measures ANOVA to test if
the stimulation had changed the participants’ moral judgment
in different conditions, including condemnation ratings and
reaction times. As we distinguished between the contexts that
involved economic interests and relationships with friends, all
these tests were applied firstly without consideration of the
difference between the two contexts (the pooled sample) and then
treating context as a within-subjects factor (sample with context).
The statistical analyses were performed using SPSS statistical
software (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
RESULTS
The Pooled Sample
The mean condemnation ratings and standard deviation
information of different conditions and different stimulation
types are shown in Figure 5 and Table 1. We first tested
FIGURE 2 | Schematic representation of the experimental process. The participant was required to perform the first moral task before stimulation. After 15 min
of stimulation, each participant was asked to complete the second task while the stimulation was continued for another 5 min.
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FIGURE 3 | Experimental design. The half of participants (Part I) were
required to complete the moral judgment task A (S1, S2) before stimulation
and complete the moral judgment task B (S∗1, S
∗
2) after stimulation, while the
rest of participants (Part II) were required to complete task B (S∗1, S
∗
2) before
stimulation and complete task A (S1, S2) after stimulation.
whether task A was different from task B before receiving
tDCS using repeated measures ANOVA with Belief (neutral vs.
negative) and Outcome (neutral vs. negative) as within-subjects
factors and Task (A vs. B) as a between-subjects factor. There
was significant effect of task neither in condemnation ratings
[F(1,106) = 0.007, P = 0.931] nor in reaction times [F(1,106) = 0.752,
P = 0.388], which made it reasonable to regard the two tasks
as equivalent and compare the performance of the participants
before and after receiving the stimulations. Meanwhile, we
found significant effect of Belief [F(1,106) = 671.932, P < 0.001],
Outcome [F(1,106) = 419.632, P < 0.001] and a significant
interaction of Belief and Outcome [F(1,106) = 109.063, P < 0.001]
in condemnation ratings.
Since there was no significant difference between
condemnation ratings and reaction times for the two
moral judgment tasks, the difference before and after the
stimulations could be attributed to the effect of tDCS. We
ran a repeated measures ANOVA with Belief (neutral vs.
negative), Outcome (neutral vs. negative) and Time (before
vs. after tDCS) as within-subjects factors and stimulation
type (right anodal/left cathodal, left anodal/right cathodal or
sham) as a between-subjects factor. Significant effects of Belief
[F(1,105) = 845.032, P < 0.001] and Outcome [F(1,105) = 586.439,
P < 0.001] were observed, which meant that the participants’
condemnation ratings of moral judgment in conditions of
negative belief (mean = 8.671) were higher than that of neutral
belief (mean = 4.354). Similarly, conditions of negative outcome
(mean = 8.192) were more condemned than conditions of
neutral outcome (mean = 4.833). Moreover, the interaction of
Belief and Outcome also had a significant effect [F(1,105) = 4.454,
P = 0.014]. Post hoc analysis using bonferroni corrections
indicated that conditions of intentional harm (mean = 8.755)
and attempted harm (mean = 8.588) were less permissible than
both conditions of accidental harm (mean = 4.398) and nonharm
(mean = 4.310). We also found significant effect of stimulation
type [F(2,105) = 5.289, P = 0.006].
Importantly, we found a slightly significant three-way
interaction involving Outcome, Time and stimulation type
[F(2,105) = 3.185, P = 0.045]. Analysis showed that in
conditions of negative outcome, participants rated higher in
condemnation after receiving right anodal/left cathodal tDCS
[before: mean = 7.833; after: mean = 8.292; P = 0.005], especially
towards intentional harm [P = 0.001]. On the other hand,
in conditions of neutral outcome, participants rated lower in
condemnation after receiving left anodal/right cathodal tDCS
[before: mean = 5.764; after: mean = 5.000; P < 0.001], both
towards attempted harm [P = 0.001] and nonharm [P = 0.015].
These findings might indicate that restraining the activity of the
RTPJ/LTPJ decreased the role of beliefs in moral judgments and
led to the participants’ moral judgments being more dependent
on the actions’ consequences.
We paid attention to reaction time as well. Applying the
above repeated measures ANOVA, we found a significant
effect of Time [F(1,105) = 7.571, P = 0.007]. It is easy to
understand that the reaction times after stimulation were shorter
than before because that the participants were more familiar
with the task. Moreover, the three-way interaction of Belief,
Time and stimulation type was trending towards significant
[F(2,105) = 2.749, P = 0.069]. Post hoc analysis indicated that the
reaction times in conditions of negative belief were significantly
shorter after left anodal/right cathodal tDCS [P = 0.004],
while in conditions of neutral belief the reaction times were
significantly shorter after sham stimulation [P = 0.023]. The
mean reaction time and standard deviation information are
displayed in supplementary materials.
Lastly, we checked whether the sequence of the two tasks
would influence the participants’ moral judgment. Repeated
measures ANOVAs showed no significant effect of sequence in
condemnation ratings [F(1,102) = 0.154, P = 0.695] or in reaction
times [F(1,102) = 1.633, P = 0.204].
Sample with Context
To test the effect of context, we added Context (economic
interests vs. relationships with friends) as a within-subjects
factor into the repeated measures ANOVAs in section
‘‘The Pooled Sample’’. We first tested the similarity of tasks
A and B. No significant effect of Task in condemnation
ratings [F(1,52) = 0.004, P = 0.947] or in reaction times
[F(1,52) = 0.407, P = 0.526] was observed. Apart from the
significant effects of Belief [F(1,52) = 427.022, P < 0.001],
Outcome [F(1,52) = 254.778, P < 0.001] and a significant
interaction of Belief and Outcome [F(1,52) = 65.701, P < 0.001] in
condemnation ratings as in sections ‘‘The Pooled Sample’’,
there was also a significant interaction of Context and
Belief [F(1,52) = 7.379, P = 0.009]. Analysis indicated that
in conditions of neutral belief, the condemnation ratings
of contexts involving economic interests were lower than
those of contexts involving relationships with friends
[P = 0.010].
We then performed repeated measures ANOVA with
Context, Belief, Outcome and Time as within-subjects factors
and stimulation type as a between-subjects factor. Again we
found significant effects of Belief [F(1,51) = 473.717, P < 0.001]
and Outcome [F(1,51) = 321.762, P < 0.001], which meant that the
participants’ ratings of moral judgment in conditions of negative
belief were higher than that of neutral belief, as well as conditions
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FIGURE 4 | Task design and experimental stimuli. (A) Schematic representation of sample scenario. Light-colored arrows mark the combinations of
“Foreshadow” and “Belief” for which the belief is false. “Foreshadow” information foreshadows whether the action will result in a neutral or negative outcome. “Belief”
information states whether the protagonist holds a belief that he is in a neutral situation and that action will result in a neutral outcome (neutral belief) or a belief that
he is a negative situation and that action (or inaction) will result in a negative outcome (negative belief). (B) Combination of belief (neutral vs. negative) and outcome
(neutral vs. negative) factors yielded a 2 × 2 design with four conditions.
of negative outcome were more condemned than conditions
of neutral outcome. The interaction of Belief and Outcome
also had a significant effect [F(1,51) = 65.255, P < 0.001]. In
addition, we found significant effects of Context [F(1,51) = 5.391,
P = 0.024], which meant that contexts involving economic
interests [mean = 6.419] was less condemned than those of
contexts involving relationships with friends [mean = 6.606].
Besides, there was a significant four-way interaction involving
Context, Belief, Time and stimulation type [F(2,51) = 3.871,
P = 0.027]. Analysis indicated that in conditions of negative belief
with contexts involving economic interests, the condemnation
ratings were lower after receiving right anodal/left cathodal tDCS
[p = 0.014]. There was also a similar but slightly less significant
effect in conditions of negative belief with contexts involving
economic interests [P = 0.069].
As for the reaction time, we found a significant effect of
Time [F(1,51) = 4.517, P = 0.038] similar to section ‘‘The Pooled
Sample’’. A significant four-way interaction of Context, Belief,
Outcome and stimulation type was also observed [F(2,51) = 3.908,
P = 0.026], indicating that in conditions of accidental harm,
the reaction times of contexts involving economic interests were
longer than those of contexts involving relationships with friends
in sham stimulation [P = 0.013]. The mean reaction time and
standard deviation information are displayed in supplementary
materials. At last, no significant effect of sequence was observed
in condemnation ratings [F(1,48) = 0.083, P = 0.774] or in reaction
times [F(1,48) = 0.855, P = 0.360].
DISCUSSION
Human moral judgment often represents a response that
depends on various factors and features that include not only
the agent’s beliefs but also the agent’s desires (Cushman, 2008),
their consequences (Greene et al., 2001), the agent’s prior
record (Kliemann et al., 2008), the cause that leads to harm
(Cushman et al., 2008), whether the action was coerced by
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 December 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 659
Ye et al. tDCS Changes Moral Judgment
FIGURE 5 | Data of condemnation ratings. (A) The condemnation ratings
of participants with four conditions in the right anodal/left cathodal treatment
before and after stimulation. (B) The condemnation ratings of participants with
four conditions in the left anodal/right cathodal treatment before and after
stimulation. (C) The condemnation ratings of participants with four conditions
in the sham treatment before and after stimulation. Blue columns,
pre-transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS); red columns, post-tDCS.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance of difference within-subject.
external circumstances (Woolfolk et al., 2006; Krebs et al., 2014),
(etc., Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; Young et al., 2010a). In the
present study, we manipulated two of these factors, the agent’s
belief and the outcomes of the action, and tested whether the
effect of modulating activity in the TPJ with tDCS was specific
to the agent’s mental state attribution for moral judgment.
This study corroborated and complemented the previous
finding by Young et al. (2010a), which postulated that
disrupting RTPJ function reduces the influence of beliefs
on moral judgment. We found that restraining the RTPJ
via tDCS caused the participants to judge attempted
harms and nonharm as less morally forbidden and more
morally permissible, while restraining the LTPJ via tDCS
caused the participants to judge accidental harms and
intentional harms as more morally forbidden and less morally
permissible. Thus, suppressing the activity in the RTPJ or
LTPJ disrupted the capacity to use mental states in moral
judgment.
To verify the robustness of our results, we modified a related
experimental design based on that of Young et al. (2010a).
Previous neurostimulation experiments of human decision-
making have primarily utilized between-subject design (Knoch
et al., 2006; Fecteau et al., 2007a,b; Boggio et al., 2010; Young
et al., 2010a). However, the corresponding results lack statistical
power due to the heterogeneity of the participants, especially
when the samples are small. Our experiment adopted a within-
subject design to avoid this interference from the heterogeneity
of the participants. Provided that the multiple exposures are
independent, this design makes it possible for causal estimates to
be obtained by examining how individual decisions change after
receiving stimulation.
Furthermore, the previous studies haven’t made sure the
balance of moral stories across the treatments. In this study, each
participant was required to complete similar moral judgment
task before and after receiving tDCS (active stimulations and
sham stimulation). We also demonstrated that task A was
equivalent to task B before receiving tDCS either in terms
of condemnation ratings or reaction times, which made it
reasonable to compare the performance of the participants
before and after receiving the stimulations. Since there was no
significant difference between the two moral judgment tasks, the
difference before and after the stimulations could be attributed to
the effect of tDCS.
Generally, moral judgments are robust to different
demographic factors such as gender, age, ethnicity, and
religion, but many complexities in moral judgment are still
left unresolved. No comprehensive model or taxonomy of
moral judgment thus far has accounted for its full diversity.
Some models call for a division of the moral space based on
the content, and there is work going one on about the role
of intentions as a function of the moral content (Shweder
et al., 1997; Rozin et al., 1999; Dungan and Young, 2012).
This content-based approach also proves fruitful in explaining
different emotional responses to different kinds of moral
violations. Specifically, there is evidence that individuals have
made difference for moral judgment between stranger and friend
(Ma, 1989; Smetana et al., 2006; Kurzban et al., 2012).
To consider the context effect on both participants’
condemnation ratings and the effects of tDCS for TPJ, we have
assigned two different types of moral context that involved friend
relationships (harm to her/his friend) and economic interests
(harm to her/his customer)—as food-safety problems in China
have contributed to a rapid decline of social trust (Yan, 2012)—as
stories of moral judgment and separately tested whether the
modulation of activity in the TPJ with tDCS changed the agents’
mental state attributions for moral judgment in both the friend
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TABLE 1 | The mean condemnation ratings and SD across conditions and stimulation types.
Condition R Anodal/L Cathodal L Anodal/R Cathodal Sham
Before After Before After Before After
Intentional harm 9.36 (0.99) 9.72 (0.51) 9.94 (0.23) 9.92 (0.37) 9.64 (0.83) 9.75 (0.5)
Accidental harm 6.31 (2.01) 6.86 (1.90) 6.44 (2.12) 6.11 (2.16) 7.03 (1.52) 6.72 (1.61)
Attempted harm 6.83 (2.70) 6.64 (2.75) 8.92 (0.97) 7.89 (2.23) 7.83 (1.61) 7.61 (1.82)
Nonharm 1.81 (1.06) 1.53 (0.88) 2.61 (1.89) 2.11 (1.53) 2.19 (2.15) 2.03 (1.9)
relationship and economic interest contexts. Analyses indicated
that in conditions of neutral belief, the condemnation ratings
of contexts involving economic interests were lower than those
of contexts involving relationship with friends. Moreover, in
conditions of negative belief with contexts involving economic
interests, the condemnation ratings were lower after receiving
right anodal/left cathodal tDCS. These findings indicate that the
restraining effect of tDCS on the LTPJ in the role of beliefs in
moral judgment depends on moral context.
The present study also investigated the participants’ reaction
times for moral judgments and found that the participants who
received restraint of the RTPJ exhibited reduced reaction times
in both the cases of intentional harms and attempted harms
when the story involved economic interests. Because restraining
the RTPJ significantly decreased the capacity to infer the actor’s
intentions in moral judgment, the participants could easily make
judgments that primarily considered the attribution of action’s
consequence when the role of belief in moral judgment was
reduced.
Many studies have shown that both the RTPJ and the LTPJ
play essential roles in the theory of mind and that the activities of
these two brain regions are associated with the understanding of
social intentions (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2007;
Aichhorn et al., 2009; Centelles et al., 2011). Recent fMRI studies
have also suggested that the bilateral TPJ are recruited for the
encoding and integrating process of beliefs (Young and Saxe,
2008). Specifically, Young et al. (2010a) used TMS to the RTPJ
to disrupt the capacity to integrate belief information. Samson
et al. (2004) reported evidence from brain-damaged patients that
indicated that the patients with lesions in the LPTJ region exhibit
impairment in false belief tasks.
In the present study, we also found that restraining the
RTPJ or LTPJ via tDCS decreased the role of beliefs in moral
judgment. Combining our findings with those of previous
work, we infer that the RTPJ and LTPJ commonly represent
the capacity to use mental states in moral judgment and that
both are responsible for the role of belief in moral judgment.
After receiving tDCS to restrain the activities of the RTPJ or
LTPJ, the role of beliefs in moral judgment is reduced. In
the four conditions of moral stories, the participants placed
more weight on the attribution of the action’s consequences
but not on intentions in moral judgment. Specifically, after
restraining the activity of the TPJ, participants judged intentional
harms and accidental harms as more morally forbidden and
less morally permissible, and the participants judged attempted
harms and nonharm as less morally forbidden and more morally
permissible. These effects might also depend on stories’ context
of moral judgment.
In conclusion, our findings provide important information
about the effects of tDCS on mental states in moral judgment.
These findings might be helpful for the study and treatment
of neurodevelopmental disorders, such as autism spectrum
disorders (ASDs). Children with ASDs are unable to impute
beliefs to others (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Even high
functioning adults with ASDs have a persistent impairment in
spontaneous mentalizing (i.e., the automatic ability to attribute
mental states to the self and others; Senju et al., 2009).
Furthermore, the impairment in the processing of the mental
states of others in autism is associated with reduced RTPJ
activity (Kana et al., 2009). Therefore, we believe that this study
might inform neural models of moral judgment and moral
development in typically developing people and in individuals
with neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism (Koster-Hale
et al., 2013).
Additionally, both folk moral judgments and legal decisions
depend on agent’s ability to make judgment for the consequences
of an individual’s actions to the beliefs and intentions of actions.
Our experiments revealed that the mental state attribution of
moral judgment, especially in cases involving attempted harm
and accidental harm, depends critically on neural activity in
the TPJ. Future studies should explore the relevance of these
findings for the real-life judgments made by judges and juries
who routinely make very detailed distinctions based on mental
state information.
Since the same participant saw all four variations of the
same story during the experiment, we acknowledged this design
may increase demand characteristics for the task as participants
could figure out the differences of four conditions. However,
we aimed to study whether tDCS to the TPJ (active stimulation
treatments) altered mental state attribution for moral judgment.
Therefore, the possibility of those demand characteristics which
were perceived by the participants would not lead to biased
experimental results. In addition, it was noted that the robustness
of the current findings across diverse moral contexts remained to
be determined because of the limited number of stimuli used in
the experiment.
Another limitation of the present study is that we were unable
to determine whether the effect on mental state attribution
of moral judgment was solely attributable to the modulation
of the activity in the RTPJ or whether the changes in moral
judgment resulted from altering the balance of activity across
the bilateral TPJ. With regard to the tDCS polarity effects,
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Jacobson et al. (2012) conducted a meta-analytical review aimed
to investigate the homogeneity/heterogeneity of the effect sizes of
the anodal-excitation and cathodal-inhibition effects dichotomy
in both motor and cognitive functions. They found that the
anode electrode is applied over a cognitive area, in most cases,
it will cause an excitation as measured by a relevant cognitive
task. However, the cathodal-inhibition effects seems to be robust
only in the motor and sensory cortex but there is wide variation
for cognitive studies. Therefore, our finding that the influence of
modulating activity in the bilateral TPJ with tDCS on the role of
beliefs in moral judgment, to a large extent, may resulted from
anodal-excitation effects, rather than cathodal-inhibition effects.
Future experiments may include neuroimaging measures to
explore the neural changes associated with the neuromodulation
that lead to decision-making effects and also to explore other
paradigms of stimulation, such as unilateral stimulation.
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